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27 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK,  
INSPECTOR GENERAL, CIA

SUBJECT : Personnel Office

REFERENCE : Your "Eyes Only" Memorandum, subject  
as above, dated 1 July 1953

1. My comments are based upon the following standards of personnel administration:

a. A commander or employer must have a constant interest in his personnel and they must feel that their interests are being protected. Each echelon of command (or responsibility) must have, therefore, a "father" of personnel.

b. Simple and uniform procedures, administered with a view to helping the individual, are necessary to maintain high morale, attract and hold good people, and thus increase the efficiency of the Agency.

Organizational Relationships

2. I am impressed by the virtual absence of close relationship between the members of the Clandestine Services and those of the Personnel Office upon whom they depend for support. This situation, of course, is aggravated by the security barrier. The "operators" are reluctant to give sufficient detail, and this tends to undermine any sympathetic attitude in the Personnel Office. The principal contacts between the two are conducted on a low level.

3. This is not the fault of either side, but results from the organizational position and location of the all inclusive Personnel Office. Whereas the entire Clandestine Services organization from DD/P on down is really

a field operating

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a field operating organization and could be located outside of the Washington area, the Personnel Office and other segments of CIA are largely departmental elements. As DD/P has the responsibilities of a field commander, he should have his own thoroughly integrated administrative set-up for all personnel under his control. During CIA's early days, there were two personnel offices. The rationalization for the present arrangement is that, since the Clandestine Services headquarters is in Washington and since the Agency must have a departmental Personnel Office in Washington, it saves bodies to combine the two in one. However, it divorces authority over personnel matters from responsibility for accomplishing the mission.

4. You will recall that, prior to the merger of the Clandestine Services, OSO and OPC had personnel staffs to exercise supervision over personnel which were necessary attributes of ADSO's and ADPC's responsibilities. I have the impression that when General Smith made his decision on merger he envisaged a comparable staff element in the Office of the new Chief of Administration under DD/P (although I am aware that the record supports neither this thesis nor the antithesis). Such a staff would have bridged the gap between the personnel offices and the operators. This would not have been a duplication but a very necessary staff service. However, this staff was never organized and the then existing personnel staff of OPC was transferred to the Central Personnel Office. This resulted in the commander (DD/P) losing control of his operating personnel to an administrative element under another commander (DD/A).

5. If the present organizational arrangement is to obtain, an effort must be made to integrate the Personnel Office with the operators much more fully than at present. The Chief of Personnel Division, Covert, should be recognized as a de facto member of the DD/P staff and should regularly meet with DD/P, CAO, and with the several career service boards within the DD/P complex. A similar relationship should be effected with the Senior Staff Chiefs, Area Division and Branch Chiefs. People are our most important asset. They must have a feeling of participation and a sense of well-being based upon the realization that their immediate chief is safeguarding their interests.

#### Career Service Program

6. While I am not qualified to comment in detail on the Career Service Program or the varying requirements which have resulted in the system described [REDACTED] I am impressed by the impersonal nature of this system. Here is a group of interlocking boards each with their own criteria and standards with partially rotating membership upon

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which employees must depend for many of the personnel services on which morale and efficiency are dependent. It therefore seems to me that in this program the personnel administration responsibilities of the various levels of command in the organization are being abdicated to a machinery which cannot give the morale of employees the necessary support. It is suggested that the Clandestine Services have only one board appointed by and responsible to DD/P, and he should have final authority in each case subject only to DCI authority.

#### Personnel Files

7. In general, CIA follows the policy issued by the Civil Service Commission regulating the maintenance and contents of personnel files. By reason of the sensitivity of its work, CIA is permitted considerable latitude in handling these records. Recently, however, the Department of State has been criticized for the inefficiency and insecurity of its personnel filing system, and a responsible officer was directed by Congress to take immediate remedial action. CIA might find itself vulnerable to similar criticism if too many custodians and systems are established and if the sensitive personnel material is susceptible to removal or is open to wide examination. This Agency should therefore favor the maintenance of one set of files along Civil Service requirement lines. These files should be open to the examination by supervisors or others requiring them for examination in connection with efficiency ratings, transfers, promotions, or routine matters consistent with Civil Service policy.

8. CIA maintains a second set of files, however, in the Office of Inspection and Security. By law these files cannot be exposed to wide examination by reason of their classifications (CIA) and the restrictions placed upon them by the FBI. The control on these files is excellent, and it seems logical to allow the Personnel Office to open a subsidiary ("Administrative") section in connection with each security file. This section would contain any derogatory information which would affect the subject's appointment, transfer, or promotion. Since a personnel action is required for each change of status, the "Administrative" section of the security files would be referred to in connection with each action.

#### Pipeline Mechanism

9. The attached chart was part of a study prepared two years ago by members of the Administration and Logistics Staff in OPC. This study pointed out the fact that the personnel pipeline was too small to permit bringing the staff up to its T/O level; that under then existing procedures,

three months were

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three months were required for prospect-search and discussion, another three months were required for clearing and recruiting processing time, and that an additional one to four months were required for post-employment training and/or adjustment to the job; that the existing T/O slots had been spread all the way back through these pipeline processes, including six months during which the employees were not even on board; that this situation was aggravated by a high degree of attrition, including attrition while people were in the pipeline; and that under these conditions the organization could never reach T/O strength. The recommended solution was either a pipeline T/O to cover people in process but not yet effectively at work, or the authorization of a given percentage over-strength. As far as I know, no further action was taken on this problem and we have recently seen Congressional action to freeze our strength at the number on board as of a given date, even though that number was approximately [REDACTED] people short of our T/O. I believe it is the responsibility of the Personnel Office to re-study this whole matter and to establish appropriate pipeline machinery to prevent future recurrences of this situation.

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Hot War Reserve

10. Also lacking is provision for establishment of the reserves in terms of personnel which CIA would be committed to supply in the event of hot war. The Unconventional Annex to the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan and the Command Relationship provisions therein make it clear that this would be a commitment far beyond the capabilities of CIA's present personnel machinery. I am submitting specific recommendations on this point, however, through appropriate channels.

Individuals Engaged in Personnel Matters

11. In the PPC Staff, [REDACTED] Administrative Officer, GS-9, is the only member of the PPC Staff who spends a considerable portion of her time on personnel matters.

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[REDACTED]  
Chief, Planning & Program  
Coordination Staff

Attachment:  
Chart

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